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Abstract: We show that an equilibrium always exists in the Rothschild-Stiglitz insurance market 
model with adverse selection when insurers can offer either non- participating or 
participating policies, i.e. insurance contracts which may involve policy dividends or 
supplementary calls for premium. The equilibrium coincides with the Miyazaki-
Spence-Wilson equilibrium, which may involves cross-subsidization between 
contracts within subgroups of individuals. The paper establishes that participating 
policies act as an implicit threat that dissuades deviant insurers who aim at attracting 
low risk individuals only. The model predicts that the mutual corporate form should be 
prevalent in insurance markets or submarkets where second-best Pareto efficiency 
requires cross-subsidization between risk types. Stock insurers and mutuals may 
coexist, with stock insurers offering insurance coverage at actuarial price and 
mutuals cross-subsidizing risks. 
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1 Introduction
The paper of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) on competitive insurance markets under
adverse selection is widely considered as one of the most important contributions to the
insurance economics literature. In this famous article, Rothschild and Stiglitz analyse
the equilibrium of an insurance market where policyholders have private information
on their risk and they reveal this information through their insurance contract choice.
High risk individuals choose to be fully covered, while low risks choose partial coverage.
In other words, the menu of contracts o¤ered in the market separates risk types.
The inuence of the Rothschild-Stiglitz paper on the academic research in insurance
economics has been and is still extremely important. In particular, it shows how
hidden information may lead to e¢ ciency losses in markets that satisfy all the axioms
of perfect competition except transparency. As a consequence, the Rothschild-Stiglitz
approach yields a way to understand why insurance markets are so deeply associated
with contractual or legal mechanisms that reduce the intensity or the consequences of
hidden information, such as risk categorization, risk auditing or experience rating.
The Rothschild-Stiglitz (RS) model nevertheless includes an enigma that has puz-
zled and annoyed many insurance economists during the last three decades : in this
model, the market equilibrium may not exist! When it is assumed that each insurer
only o¤ers a single contract there is no pooling equilibrium, at which all individuals
would take out the same contract o¤ered by all insurers. Indeed, at a candidate pool-
ing equilibrium insurers make zero prot, but any insurer can deviate to a protable
contract with lower coverage and lower premium by attracting only low risk individ-
uals. Thus the only type of equilibrium that may exist is separating, with high risks
and low risks choosing di¤erent contracts. However, it turns out that a separating
equilibrium only exists when the population includes a subtantial proportion of high
risk individuals. That may be easily understood. Indeed separating risk types entails
a welfare loss for low risk individuals, since they should be o¤ered a contract with low
coverage, so that high risk individuals prefer a full insurance contract at high actuarial
price rather than mimicking low risk individuals. However, when the proportion of
high risks is low enough, insurers may make prot by deviating from this separating
allocation to another contract that would attract high risks and low risks simultane-
ously. In other words, a pooling equilibrium never exists because of the protable
cream skimming strategy and a separating equilibrium neither exists when the weight
of low risk individuals is too small to let high risks incur the welfare loss associated
with the separation of risk types. As observed by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976)
themselves, allowing each insurer to o¤er a menu of contracts makes the condition
under which an equilibrium exists even more restrictive. Indeed, no equilibrium with
cross-susbsidization can exist, for obviously each insurer would prefer to delete the con-
tract in decit. Any candidate equilibrium is separating without cross-subsidization
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and the contracts o¤ered at such a candidate equilibrium coincide with those o¤ered
at the separating equilibrium when each insurer only o¤ers one single contract: high
risk individuals are fully covered, while low risk individual purchase partial insurance.
However such an equilibrium exists only if the separating allocation is not Pareto-
dominated by a menu of contracts with cross-subsidization, which once again requires
the proportion of high risk individuals to be large enough. The proportion of high risk
individuals under which the equilibrium does not exist is larger when each insurance
company o¤ers a menu than when it only o¤ers a single contract. In other words,
allowing insurers to o¤er a menu does not change the candidate separating allocation,
but it makes the existence of equilibrium even less likely.
Rather than a theoretical oddity, a model without equilibrium is like a map with
terra incognita showing some unexplored territories. In other words, observing that
no equilibrium may exist is just a way to acknowledge that the model does not always
predict where market forces are leading us. In game theory words, an equilibrium of the
RS model is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of a two stage game, in which insurers
simultaneously o¤er insurance contracts at stage 1 and then at stage 2 individuals
choose the contract they prefer in the menu of available o¤ers. Most theorists who
have tackled the equilibrium nonexistence problem have strayed away from this simple
and most natural timing. The "anticipatory equilibrium" of Miyazaki (1977), Spence
(1978) andWilson (1977), the "reactive equilibrium" of Riley (1979) and the variations
on the equilibrium concept introduced by Hellwig (1987) and Engers and Fernandez
(1987) share this common strategy, which consists in introducing some interactive
dynamics among insurers. The existence of equilibrium can then be established, but at
the cost of much arbitraryness in the structure of the game and thus of its predictions.
In this paper we will head in a di¤erent direction by focusing attention on the
nature of contracts which are traded in the insurance market. It is indeed striking to
observe that almost all the papers which have focused attention on the equilibrium
existence issue seem to have taken for granted that the insurance contracts should take
the simple form of non-participating contracts postulated by Rothschild and Stiglitz
(1976) and this simple form only. A non-participating insurance contract species a
xed premium and an indemnity to be paid should a loss occurs. Even if we do not
modify on any other aspect the setting of the RS model (a one period market with
all insurers playing simultaneously, two types of risk averse individuals, losses of given
size in case of an accident, etc...), we should at least keep in mind that insurers may
also o¤er participating contracts, i.e. contracts with policy dividend when risk under-
writing proved to be protable and supplementary call when it was in decit. After
all, in the real world, mutuals and sometimes stock insurers o¤er participating con-
tracts1. Focusing attention on non-participating contracts only amounts to restricting
1The mutual market share at the end of 2006 was 24% (and 28% for non-life business). Of the
largest ten insurance countries, representing 78% of the world market, ve of them have over 25% of
their markets in mutual and cooperative business, namely Germany 41%, France 40%; Japan 36%,
USA 30% and Spain 29%. See www.icmif.org on the activity of the cooperative and mutual insurance
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the shape of insurance contracts in an unjustied way. As we will see in this paper,
eliminating this restriction on contractual arrangements restores the existence of the
equilibrium in the RS model.
It would be unfair not to acknowledge the contribution of the few papers that have
addressed the role of mutuals o¤ering participating contracts in the RS environnement.
Boyd, Prescott and Smith (1988) have used a cooperative game theoretic approach in
which individuals are viewed as forming coalitions for the purpose of pooling risk.
Any coalition decides upon an "arrangement" that species the risk sharing within
the coalition, as a function of its membership. A coalition may be interpreted as a
mutual and an arrangement as a participating contract. Boyd, Prescott and Smith
(1988) show that the Miyazaki-Spence-Wilson (MSW) equilibrium allocation2 is a core
arrangement associated with an unblocked incumbent (grand) coalition that would in-
clude all individuals. However they do not analyse the competition between mutuals.
By contrast, the present paper shows that the MSW allocation can be sustained as a
subgame perfect equilibrium of a non-cooperative game played by insurers who interact
with individual agents in a competitive market. Smith and Stutzer (1990) analyse how
participating policies serve as a self-selection device when there is exogenous aggre-
gate uncertainty. They interpret mutuals as insurance rms that share undiversiable
aggregate risk with policyholders through participating contract, contrary to stock
insurers who share this risk with shareholders. However they do not observe that a
pooling equilibrium may occur under participating contracts, and consequently they
do not say anything about equilibrium existence issues. Ligon and Thistle (2005) study
the coexistence between mutuals or between mutuals and stock insurers They show
that, under certain conditions, a separating equilibrium exists in which high risks form
large mutuals and low risks form small mutuals. The conditions under which this sep-
arating equilibrium exists are analogous to those under which a separating equilibrium
exists in the standard RS model.
sector worldwide. Mutuals usually charge their members a premium, known as an advance call, at
the start of each policy period. However, they have the right to charge additional premium, known as
a supplementary call, if they need additional income to pay claims or increase the reserves. They may
also refund part of the advance call if the fortunes of the nancial year are better than expected.
Note however that the present paper will conclude that policy dividends and supplementary calls
act as implicit threats against competitors, which does not mean that they should be frequently
observed in practice. After all e¢ cient threats have not to be carried out ! We should also keep
in mind that mutuals smooth the distribution of surpluses and the allocation of shortfalls between
participating members by making transfers to or from their reserves. In other words, mutuals also act
as an intertemporal resource allocation mechanism. Mutuals will ask the participating members for
a supplementary call when liabilities exceed assets. When assets exceed liabilities, then the balance
may be either transferred to the mutuals reserve or returned to the members, which is usually done
in proportion of their respective premiums and subscriptions. See Section 5 on deferred premium
variations as substitutes to policy dividends and supplementary calls.
2When there are two risk types, the Miyazaki-Spence-Wilson allocation maximizes the expected
utility of low risk individuals in the set of second-best feasible allocations, i.e. allocations that break
even on aggregate and satisfy incentive compatibility constraints.
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The central argument of this paper may be set out in a few words. In our model,
when there is cross-subsidization between risk types, participating policies act as an
implicit threat against deviant insurers who would like to attract low risks only. This
is actually a very intuitive result. Indeed, assume that high risk individuals have taken
out a participating policy which is cross-subsidized by low risk individuals. In such
a case, when low risk types move to another insurer, the situation of high risk types
deteriorates (because of the participating nature of their insurance contract), which
means that it is more di¢ cult for the deviant insurer to attract low risk individuals
without attracting also high risk individuals. An equilibrium with cross-subsidization
is thus possible because of this implicit threat. Our model thus predicts that we
should observe participating contracts when there is cross-subsidization between risk
types, and non-participating contracts otherwise3. In the two risk type case, alloca-
tions with cross-subsidization Pareto-dominate the Rosthchild-Stiglitz pair of contracts
when the proportion of large risks is small. In that case there is no equilibrium in the
Rothschild-Stiglitz model with non-participating contracts, while an equilibrium with
cross-subsidized participating contracts actually exists. Since participating contracts
are mainly o¤ered by mutuals, and non-participating contracts by stock insurers4, we
deduce that the mutual corporate form should be prevalent in markets or segments
of markets with cross-subsidization between risk types, while there should be stock
insurers (and possibly also mutuals) in other cases.
The model is presented in Section 2, with a brief reminder of the RS model. Sec-
tions 3 and 4 characterize the market equilibrium when insurers can o¤er participating
or non-participating contracts. Section 3 restricts attention to the two-risk type case,
as in the RS model. It starts with the most simple case where each insurer is supposed
to o¤er only one contract, and then it considers the more realistic setting where each
insurer can o¤er several contracts (say a menu of insurance policies). Most develop-
ments in Section 3 are based on gures, with an intuitive game theory framework.
Section 4 extends our results to the case of an arbitrary number of risk types, within
a more formal game theory setting. In this Section, we rst introduce the market
game, which is a two stage game where insurers o¤er menus of (participating or non-
participating) contracts at stage 1, and individuals react at stage 2 by choosing the
contract they prefer among the o¤ers available in the market. An equilibrium allo-
cation is sustained by a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the market game. We
3More precisely, it turns out that participating contracts are of particular interest when risk cross-
subsidization improves the e¢ ciency in insurance markets. Otherwise, non-participating contracts do
the job as well. Note also that no policy dividend is paid and no supplementary call is made on the
equilibrium path of our model. In other words, these are implicit threats which are not carried out at
equilibrium. In practice, more often than not, mutuals pay policy dividends or call for supplementary
contributions when some unexpected factor a¤ects the return on their assets or invalidates their loss
assumptions.
4This distinction is valid for property-casualty insurance. Stock insurers also o¤er participating
life insurance contracts.
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dene a candidate equilibrium allocation as done by Spence (1978) in his extension
of the Miyazaki-Wilson equilibrium. We then show that this candidate equilibrium
allocation is sustained by subgame perfect strategies of the market game where insur-
ers o¤er participating contracts in the segments of markets (i.e. for subgroups of risk
types) with cross-subsidization, and non-participating contracts in the other segments.
Section 5 sketches a dynamic extension of our model. It shows that transferring under-
writing prots to reserves and increasing or decreasing premiums according to the level
of accumated surplus may act as a substitute to policy dividend or supplemenrary call
with similar strategic e¤ects. Such deferred premium variations involve more complex
competitive mechanisms with a signalling dimension. Concluding comments follow in
Section 6. Proofs are in the Appendix.
2 The model
We consider a large population represented by a continuum of individuals facing idio-
syncratic risks of accident. All individuals are risk averse : they maximize the expected
utility of wealth u(W ); where W denotes wealth and the (twice continuously di¤er-
entiable) utility function u is such that u0 > 0 and u00 < 0: If no insurance policy is
taken out, we have W = WN in the no-accident state and W = WA in the accident
state; A = WN   WA is the loss from an accident5. Individuals di¤er according to
their probability of accident  and they have private information on their own ac-
cident probability. There are n types of individuals, with  = i for type i with
0 < n < n 1 < ::: < 1 < 1. Hence the larger the index i the lower the probability
of an accident. i is the fraction of type i individuals among the whole population
with
Pn
i=1 i = 1. This Section and the following focus on the two risk type case, i.e.
n = 2. Type 1 is a high risk and type 2 is a low risk and  = 11+(1 2)2 denotes
the average probability of loss.
Insurance contracts are o¤ered by m insurers (m  2) indexed by j = 1; :::;m
who are the managers of the insurance rms. They may be stock insurers or mutual
insurers. Stock insurers pool risks between policyholders through non-participating
insurance contracts and they transfer underwriting prot to risk neutral shareholders.
Mutual insurers have no shareholders : they share risks between their members only
through participating contracts. The insurance corporate form is not given ex ante :
it will be a consequence of the kind of insurance contracts o¤ered at the equilibrium
of the insurance market, and as we shall see this contract form (participating or non-
participating) is the outcome of competitive pressures. The underwriting activity
as well as all the other aspects of the insurance business (e.g. claims handling) are
supposed to be costless. Insurers earn xed fees in a competitive market. The mere
5The word "accident" is taken in its generic meaning: it refers to any kind of insurable loss, such
as health care expenditures or re damages.
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fact that they may transfer risks to risk neutral investors lead them to maximize the
expected residual prot which is the di¤erence between underwriting prots and policy
dividends6.
We assume that each individual can take out only one contract. An insurance
contract is written as (k; x) where k is the insurance premium, x is the net payout in
case of an accident. Hence x + k is the indemnity. Participating insurance contracts
also specify how policy dividends are paid or supplementary premiums are levied. For
example, in the simple case where each insurer only o¤ers a single contract, policy
dividend D may be written as a proportion  of prot per policyholder P (or more
generally as a function of P ), with  = 0 for a non-participating contract and  = 1
for a full participating contract7. Since individual risks are independently distributed,
when contract (k; x) is taken out by a large population of individuals, its average prot
may be written as
P = 1P1 + 2P2;
where i is the proportion of type i individuals among the purchasers of this contract,
with 1+2 = 1 and P1; P2 respectively denote the expected prot made on high and
low risk policyholders8. Using D = P then allows us to write the expected utility of
a policyholder as
Eu = (1  )u(WN   k + P ) + u(WA + x+ P );
with  = 1 or 2 according to the policyholders type.
As a reminder, let us begin with a brief presentation of the RS model. Roth-
schild and Stiglitz restrict attention to non-participating contracts. An equilibrium
in the sense of Rothschild and Stiglitz consists of a set of contracts such that, when
individuals choose contracts to maximize expected utility, (i): Each contract in the
equilibrium set makes non-negative expected prot, and (ii): There is no contract
outside the equilibrium set that, if o¤ered in addition to those in the equilibrium set,
would make strictly positive expected prots. This concept of equilibrium may be
understood as a pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of a game where in-
surers simultaneously o¤er contracts and individuals respond by choosing one of the
contracts (or refusing them all). At equilibrium, each contract makes zero prot and
6Indeed if an insurer could increase the residual expected prot by o¤ering other insurance policies,
then he could contract with risk neutral investors and secure higher xed fees. Note that the residual
prot of a mutual is nil if prots are distributed as policy dividends or losses are absorbed through
supplementary premiums. In that case, if the mutual insurer could make positive residual prot, then
he would benet from becoming a stock insurer. In the real world, the fact is the corporate form of
insurance rms sometimes change and "demutualization" has been frequently observed in insurance
markets. In particular, over 200 US mutual life insurance companies have demutualized since 1930
and numerous large mutuals decided to demutualize during the last decade.
7Formally, a supplementary premium is equivalent to D < 0.
8In other words, we use the law of large number to identify the average prot with the expected
prot made on a policyholder who is randomly drawn among the customers.
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there is no protable deviation at the contract o¤ering stage, given the subsequent
reaction of the insurance purchasers.
Let Ci = (k

i ; x

i ) = (iA;A iA) be the actuarially fair full insurance contract for
a type i. Rothschild and Stiglitz show that there cannot be a pooling equilibrium where
both groups would buy the same contract. Only a separating equilibrium can exist :
di¤erent types then choose di¤erent contracts. They establish that the only candidate
separating equilibrium is such that high risk individuals (i.e. types 1) purchase full
insurance at fair price, i.e. they choose C1 ; and low risk individuals (types 2) purchase
a contract C2 with partial coverage. C

2 is the contract that low risk individuals most
prefer in the set of (fairly priced) contracts that do not attract high risk individuals:
C2 = (k

2 ; x

2 ) = (2A
0; A0   2A0) with A0 2 (0; A) given by
u(WN   1A) = (1  1)u(WN   2A0) + 1u(WA + (1  2)A0): (1)
Rothschild and Stiglitz also show that the candidate equilibrium C1 ; C

2 is actually an
equilibrium (in the sense of the above denition) if and only if 1 is large enough. The
RS equilibrium is illustrated in Figure 1, with state-dependent wealth on each axis9.
W 1 = WN   k and W 2 = WA + x respectively denote nal wealth in the no-accident
state and in the accident state. The no-insurance situation corresponds to point E
with coordinates W 1 = WN and W 2 = WA. The high risk and low risk fair-odds
line go through E, with slopes (in absolute value) respectively equal to 1  1=1 and
1   2=2: At C1 the type 1 indi¤erence curve is tangent to the type 1 fair-odds line
EF1. Similarly, C2 is at a tangency point between a type 2 indi¤erence curve and
the type 2 fair-odds line EF2. C2 is at the intersection between EF2 and the type 1
indi¤erence curve that goes through C1 . EF in Figure 1 corresponds to the average
fair-odds line with slope 1  =.
Figure 1
A pooling allocation with zero prot would correspond to a contract located on EF ,
such as C in Figure 2. However a pooling equilibrium cannot exist in the RS model
because o¤ering a contract like C 0 would be a protable deviation that would attract
low risks only.
Figure 2
When 1 = 
, the low risk indi¤erence curve that goes through C2 is tangent to EF .
Hence when 1  , as in Figure 1, the allocation C1 ; C2 is a separating equilibrium
of the RS model: type 1 individuals choose C1 , types 2 choose C

2 and no insurer can
make prot by o¤ering a contract that would attract either one type or both types of
individuals. Conversely when 1 < 
, as in Figure 3, the separating allocation C1 ; C

2
9When no ambiguity occurs, we use the same notation for insurance contracts (k; x) and their
images in the (W 1;W 2) plane.
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is Pareto-dominated by a pooling allocation like C 0 where all individuals choose the
same contract. Hence there exists a protable deviation in which the deviant insurer
would attract all individuals and no equilibrium exists in this case.
Figure 3
The above given denition of an equilibrium assumes that each insurer can only
o¤er one contract. At equilibrium some insurers o¤er C1 and others o¤er C

2 : When
insurers are allowed to o¤er a menu of contract, then the denition of an equilibrium
in the sense of Rothschild and Stiglitz consists of a set of menus that break even on
average, such that there is no menu of contracts outside the equilibrium set that, if
o¤ered in addition, would make strictly positive expected prots. In a game theory
setting, the equilibrium is a pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of a game
where insurers simultaneously o¤er menus, and then individuals respond either by
selecting the contract they prefer in the menus o¤ered in the market. At equilibrium,
each menu makes zero aggregate prot and there is no protable deviation at the
menu o¤ering stage, given the subsequent reaction of the insurance purchasers. At an
equilibrium, the menu C1 ,C

2 is o¤ered by all insurers: types 1 choose C

1 and types 2
choose C2 . Hence the set of equilibrium contracts is unchanged, with zero prot made
on each contract. An equilibrium exists if 1   where  2 (; 1). Hence the
possibility of o¤ering a menu increases the critical proportion of high risk individuals
above which an equilibrium exists. It thus makes the existence of equilibrium less
likely.
3 Equilibrium with participating contracts
We rst focus on the case where each insurer o¤ers a single contract, before considering
the more general setting where insurers can o¤er menus.
3.1 Case where each insurer o¤ers one contract
We characterize the subgame perfect equilibrium of a two stage game. At stage 1 each
insurer j o¤ers a contract Cj = (kj; xj) with policy dividend Dj = jP j, where P j
denotes the prot per policyholder and j 2 [0; 1]. The contractual o¤er of insurer
j is thus characterized by (Cj; j). At stage 2, individuals respond by choosing the
contract they prefer among the o¤ers made by the insurers10. In other words, the only
10For any set of contracts C = (C1; :::; Cm) o¤ered at stage 1, individuals have expectations about
policy dividends Dj , for all j = 1; :::;m, or equivalently about the risk type distribution of individuals
who choose Cj . When Cj is actually chosen by some individuals, then these expectations coincide
with equilibrium values, and otherwise there is no restriction on these expectations.
9
di¤erence with the RS model is that we allow insurers to o¤er either participating or
non-participating contracts. Because this is just an extension of the RS model obtained
by suppressing a restriction on the set of feasible contracts, we will call it the extended
RS model.
When the population of individuals who choose (Cj; j) includes type i individuals
in proportion ji with 
j
1 + 
j
2 = 1, then we may draw the corresponding average fair-
odds line, labelled EF
j
in Figure 4. It goes through E and its slope is 1   j=j in
absolute value, with j = j11+
j
22. It coincides with EF1,EF2 or EF if 
j
1 = 1; 0 or
1. In Figure 4, point Cj corresponds to the lottery (W
j1
0 ;W
j2
0 ) which is associated with
contract Cj without any sharing of prot, i.e. W j10 = WN   kj and W j20 = WA + xj11.
When j = 1 then contract Cj generates a lottery on nal wealth Cj1 = (W
j1
1 ;W
j2
1 )
which is at the crossing between EF
j
and the 45 line which goes through Cj. When
0 < j < 1 then the lottery on nal wealth associated with contract Cj is located in
the interior of the line segment CjCj1 , like C
j
2 in Figure 4.
Figure 4
As in the RS model, two types of equilibrium have to be considered in the extended
RS model, either a separating equilibrium or a pooling equilibrium12. Consider rst a
separating equilibrium : types 1 and types 2 would then choose di¤erent contracts. We
know from the RS model that if a separating equilibrium exists, then the corresponding
lotteries on nal wealth should be C1 for type 1 and C

2 for type 2, for otherwise a
protable deviation would exist. We also know from the RS model that there does
not exist any protable deviation through non-participating contracts if and only if
1  . Since any deviation through a participating contract can be replicated
by a deviation through a non-participating contract13, we deduce that 1   is a
necessary and su¢ cient condition for a separating equilibrium to exist.
Consider now a pooling equilibrium: type 1 and type 2 individuals then choose
the same contract. As in the RS model, the equilibrium lottery on nal wealth is
necessarily located on EF , More specically, this lottery has to be located at the
11Of course the lottery depends on the policyholders type: W 1 =W j10 (resp. W
j2
0 ) with probability
i (resp. 1  i) for a type i individual.
12We can check that individuals do not randomize at equilibrium. In particular there is no semi-
separating equilibrium where two di¤erent contracts would be o¤ered and all `-types (resp. h-types)
would choose the same contract while h-types (resp. `-types) would be shared between both contracts.
13Replicating a deviation means that there exists a non-participating contract that would induce
an amount of prot for the deviant which is equal to the residual prot (i.e. prot after policy
dividends have been paid) obtained with participating contract o¤ered in deviation from equilibrium.
Indeed assume for instance that insurer j deviates from its equilibrium strategy to the participating
contract Cj = (kj ; xj), with a proportion of prot j distributed as policy dividends. Let P j be
the prot of insurer j at a continuation equilibrium following this deviation to Cj and consider the
non-participating contract Cj0 = (kj   jP j ; xj + jP j). At a continuation equilibrium following the
deviation to Cj0, the prot of insurer j would be equal to its residual prot after the deviation to Cj .
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tangency point between EF and a type 2 indi¤erence curve: this is bC in Figure 5.
Indeed, at any other point on EF it would be possible to make prot by deviating
to a non-participating contract that would attract types 1 (and also possibly types
2), which would contradict the denition of an equilibrium. We also know from the
RS model (see Figure 2) that a non-participating contract cannot be o¤ered at such a
pooling equilibrium, for otherwise there would exist a protable deviation attracting
types 2, while types 1 would keep choosing the same contract. Let us focus on a
symmetric pooling equilibrium with a participating contract o¤ered by each insurer
and such that 1 = 2 = ::: = m = .
Figure 5
W.l.o.g. consider a deviation where an insurer o¤ers a non-participating contract
C 0, while other insurers keep o¤ering bC14. bC is a pooling equilibrium if for any de-
viation C 0 there exists a continuation equilibrium which makes it unprotable. We
may restrict attention to deviations such that types 2 choose C 0 and types 1 keep
choosing bC15. As illustrated in Figure 5, contract bC will then generate a lottery bC1
if  = 1 and a lottery like bC2 on the bC bC2 line segment if 0 <  < 1. If C 0 in the
grey area in Figure 5 , then any continuation equilibrium is such that types 2 choose
C 0, types 1 choose bC, and the deviant insurer makes positive prot. For 1 and 2
given (and thus for bC given), this grey area is shrinking when  is increasing. When
looking for the existence of a pooling equilibrium we may thus restrict attention to
the case where  = 1 since it corresponds to the smallest set of protable deviations16.
Observe that the type 2 expected utility is lower at any lottery in the grey area than
at C2 . Thus 1   is a su¢ cient condition for the grey area to vanish. In that
case (which is represented in Figure 6) there does not exists any deviation C 0 with
positive prot at all continuation equilibrium and thus a pooling equilibrium exists.
In the case drawn in Figure 5 deviations located in the grey area are protable at any
continuation equilibrium and there is no pooling equilibrium. We may observe that a
pooling equilibrium at bC coexists with a separating equilibrium at C1 ; C2 when 1 is
larger but close to .
Figure 6
Proposition 1 An equilibrium always exists in the extended RS model with a single
contract per insurer. A participating contract is o¤ered at a pooling equilibrium, while
14Once again any deviation through a participating contract could be replicated by a deviation
through a non-participating contract.
15Obviously, deviation C 0 that would attract only type 1 individuals cannot be protable. If C 0
attract both types, then there exist out of equilibrium expectations on policy dividends for bC (or on
the risk type of individuals who choose bC ) such that C 0 canot be protable at such a continuation
equilibrium : for instance expectations stipulating that bC is chosen by type 2 individuals only.
16Note that when  = 1 the equilibrium contract (i.e. the lottery without any sharing of prot)
could be located at any point on the 45 line that goes through bC.
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contracts may be participating or non-participating at a separating equilibrium. A
separating equilibrium exists when 1   with the same pair of contracts C1 ,C2 and
the same individual choices as in the RS model. There exists a pooling equilibrium
where all individuals choose bC when 1  . When 1 is larger than  but close to
, a pooling equilibrium at bC coexists with a separating equilibrium at C1 ,C2 .
Proposition 1 states that an equilibrium always exists in the extended RS model
with a single contract per insurer. It coincides with the Rothschild-Stiglitz separat-
ing allocation when the proportion of high risks is large and it is a pooling allocation
when this proportion is low, with an overlap of the two regimes. The pooling allocation
maximizes the type 2 expected utility among the allocations that break even on aggre-
gate and it should be sustained by a participating contract, contrary to the separating
allocation that may be sustained by participating or non-participating contracts.
3.2 Case where insurers o¤er menus of contracts
Let us assume now that each insurer j o¤ers a menu of contracts Cj1 ; C
j
2 where C
j
i is
chosen by type i individuals. Each contract in the menu may be participating or non-
participating. If both contracts are participating, then the contractual arrangements
specify how distributed prots are splitted between the policyholders17. Because of
the information asymmetry between insurers and insureds the lotteries on nal wealth
should satisfy incentives constraints, i.e. type 1 individuals should weakly prefer the
lottery generated by Cj1 to the lottery generated by C
j
2 and conversely for type 2.
The lotteries generated at a candidate equilibrium of the extended RS model with
menus should maximize the expected utility of type 2 individuals in the set of lot-
teries that break even and that satisfy incentive compatibility constraints18. We
may refer to these lotteries as the Miyazaki-Spence-Wilson (MSW) allocation because
they correspond to the equilibrium contracts under the anticipatory equilibrium hy-
pothesis introduced by Wilson (1977) and Miyazaki (1977) and further developped by
Spence (1978). We know from Crocker and Snow (1986) that there exist a thresh-
old  in (; 1) such that the MSW allocation coincide with the Rothschild-Stiglitz
17For instance, policy dividends paid to the individuals who have chosen Cj1 may depend on the
prot made on Cj1 only, or on the aggregate prot on (C
j
1 ; C
j
2).
18Obviously the menu o¤ered by insurers should break even, for otherwise insurers would deviate to
a "zero contract" without indemnity and premium, i.e. they would exit the market. The equilibrium
menu could neither make positive prot because in such a case there would exist a protable deviation
in which an insurer would attract all insureds by slightly decreasing the premiums of both contracts. If
the menu o¤ered at equilibrium were not second-best Pareto-optimal then each insurer could deviate
to a protable incentive-compatible menu of non-participating contracts that would attract both
types, hence a contradiction with the denition of an equilibrium. If the expected utility of type 2
individuals were not maximized in this set of second-best Pareto-optimal allocation then it would be
possible to attract individuals from the type 2 group by o¤ering a menu of non-participating contracts
that would be protable even if it also attracts type 1 individuals, hence once again a contradiction
with the denition of an equilibrium.
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pair of contracts C1 ,C

2 without cross-subsidization when 1  , while it involves
cross-subsidization between contracts when 1  19. We also know that the set of
second-best Pareto-optimal lotteries is represented in the W 1;W 2 plane by a locus,
denoted GH in Figures 7 and 8. Figure 7 corresponds to the case where 1  .
In that case, there exists an equilibrium in the RS model, and it is obviously still the
case in the extended RS model: the equilibrium coincides with the Rothschild-Stiglitz
allocation, with full coverage at C1 for type 1 and partial coverage at C

2 for type 2
20.
Figure 7
The case where 1 < 
 is drawn in Figure 8. The type 2 expected utility is
maximized in the set of second-best allocations at eC2. The lottery eC1 should then
be attributed to type 1 individuals. eC1 is a full coverage policy chosen by type 1
individuals. It is cross-subsidized by eC2, which is a partial coverage policy chosen
by types 2. eC1; eC2 is thus the candidate equilibrium lottery. Assume that eC2 is a
non-participating contract and eC1 is a participating contract with full distribution of
the prots or repayment of the losses made by the insurer. Any menu of contracts
o¤ered by a deviant insurer can be protable only if it includes a contract C 0 which
only attracts individuals from the type 2 group and we may assume w.l.o.g. that
C 0 is a non-participating contract. When such an o¤er is made, the type 1 lottery
shifts from eC1 to C1 since type 1 individuals are now the only customers of the non-
deviant insurers and eC1 is a participating contract with full repayment of losses by
policyholders. If C 0 is protable when chosen by types 2 and not attractive for types 1,
then type 2 individuals reach an expected utility which is (weakly) lower than at C2 ,
and thus lower than at eC2 when 1 < . Hence, following such a deviation where
C 0 is o¤ered, there exists a continuation equilibrium where type 2 individuals keep
choosing eC2 and the deviant insurer doesnt make any prot. We conclude that eC1; eC2
is a separating equilibrium with cross-subsidization between contracts when 1 < 
.
Figure 8
Proposition 2 An equilibrium always exists in the extended RS model with menus; it
is generically unique and it coincides with the MSW allocation. When 1  , the
separating contracts of the RS model C1 ,C

2 are o¤ered at equilibrium without cross-
subsidization and they may be participating or non-participating. When 1  , the
separating contracts eC1; eC2 are o¤ered at equilibrium with cross-subsidization. ContracteC1 which is chosen by type 1 individuals is participating, while eC2 which is chosen by
type 2 individuals may be participating or non-participating. The menu of contracts
o¤ered at an equilibrium with cross-subsidization maximizes the type 2 expected utility
under the zero-prot constraint and incentive compatibility conditions.
19The MSW equilibrium is unique (in the two risk type case) except when 1 = 

1 .
20Participating contracts are thus useless when 1  .
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Proposition 2 states that a unique equilibrium exists in the extended RS model with
menus o¤ered by insurers. It coincides with the MSW allocation, which entails cross-
subsidization and a participating contract o¤ered to high risks when 1  , while
there is no cross-subsidization and participating contracts are useless when   .
4 The n-type problem
We now assume that there is an arbitrary number of risk types in the population. More
heavy notations are required to precisely describe the market game. As before, each in-
surer o¤ers a menu of participating or non-participating contracts at the rst stage and
individuals respond by choosing their prefered policy at the second stage. A strategy
of insurer j is dened by a menu of n contracts, one for each type of individual, written
as Cj = (Cj1 ; C
j
2 ; :::; C
j
n; D
j(:)) where Cjh = (k
j
h; x
j
h) species the premium k
j
h and the
net indemnity xjh. D
j(:) is a policy dividend strategy, i.e. a way to distribute the net
prots made on Cj, with Dj(:) = (Dj1(:); :::; D
j
n(:)), where D
j
h(N
j
1 ; P
j
1 ; :::; N
j
n; P
j
n) de-
notes the policy dividend paid to each individual who has chosen contract Cjh when N
j
i
individuals (expressed as a proportion of the whole population) have chosen contract
Cji with average prot per policyholder P
j
i , with i = 1; :::; n and
mX
j=1
nX
i=1
N ji = 1
21. Cj
is fully participating if
nX
h=1
N jhD
j
h(N
j
1 ; P
j
1 ; :::; N
j
n; P
j
n) 
nX
h=1
N jhP
j
h
while Djh(N
j
1 ; P
j
1 ; :::; N
j
n; P
j
n)  0 for all h when Cj is non-participating22. Let C 
(C1; C2; :::; Cm) be the prole of contract menus o¤ered in the market. The strategy
of a type i individual species for all j and all h the probability jih(C) to choose C
j
h
as a function of C. The contract choice strategy of type i individual is thus dened
by i(C)  fjih(C) 2 [0; 1] for j = 1; :::;m and h = 1; :::; n with
mX
j=1
nX
h=1
jih(C) = 1g
for all C. Let (:)  (1(:); 2(:); :::; n(:)) be a prole of individualsstrategies.
When an insurance contract Cjh = (k
j
h; x
j
h) is taken out by a type i individual,
with (non-random) policy dividend Djh, the policyholders expected utility and the
21Once again Djh < 0 corresponds to a supplementary premium levied on C
j
h. We assume that D
j
h
is dened when
Pn
i=1N
j
i > 0 and it does not depend on P
j
i when N
j
i = 0 since P
j
i is not dened in
that case.
22Cj may be fully participating with Djh  0 for some h. In other words, a fully participating menu
may include non-participating policies.
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corresponding insurers prot are respectively written as
Ui(C
j
h; D
j
h)  (1  i)u(WN   kjh +Djh) + iu(WA + xjh +Djh);
i(C
j
h)  (1  i)kjh   ixjh:
Denition 1 A prole of strategies e(:); eC  ( eC1; eC2; :::; eCm), where eCj = ( eCj1 ; eCj2 ; :::; eCjn; eDj(:));
is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the market game if :
mX
j=1
nX
h=1
ejih(C)Ui(Cjh; Djh(C)) = maxfUi(Cjh; Djh(C)); j = 1; :::;m; h = 1; :::; ng
for all i = 1; :::; n and all C (2)

j
( eC)  j(Cj; eC j) for all Cj and all j = 1; :::;m (3)
where C  (C1; C2; :::; Cm),Cj = (Cj1 ; Cj2 ; :::; Cjn; Dj(:)); eC j = ( eC1; :::; eCj 1; eCj+1; :::;eCm) and

j
(C) 
nX
h=1
nX
i=1
iejih(C)[i(Cjh) Djh(C)]; (4)
D
j
h(C)  Djh(N
j
1(C); P
j
1(C); :::; N
j
n(C); P
j
n(C)) if
nX
i=1
N
j
i (C) > 0; (5)
N
j
h(C) =
nX
i=1
iejih(C) and P jh(C) =
nX
i=1
iejih(C)i(Cjh)
nX
i=1
iejih(C) if N
j
h(C) > 0:
The notations in Denition 1 are as follows. Consider a prole of contracts C =
(C1; :::; Cm) where Cj = (Cj1 ; C
j
2 ; :::; C
j
n; D
j(:)) is the menu o¤ered by insurer j. N
j
h(C)
is the proportion of individuals who choose Cjh when C is o¤ered, with P
j
h(C) the prot
per policyholder. Then D
j
h(C) and 
j
(C) dened by (4) and (5) respectively denote
the policy dividend for contract Cjh and the residual prot of insurer j. They depend on
the set of contracts C o¤ered in the market and on the prole of individualscontract
choice strategy e(:). In particular Djh(C) = eDjh(N j1 (C); P j1 (C); :::; N jn(C); P jn(C)) if
Cj = eCj.
Keeping these notations in mind, (2) and (3) correspond to the standard denition
of a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. From (2), choosing Cjh with probability ejih(C)
is an optimal contract choice for type i individuals. (3) means that eCj is an optimal
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o¤er by insurer j (i.e. an o¤er that maximizes residual prot) when eC j is o¤ered by
the other insurers, given the contract choice strategy of individuals.
Let C denote the menu of contracts at a symmetric equilibrium of the mar-
ket game (dened as an equilibrium where all insurers o¤er the same menu and
individuals are evenly shared between insurers), with eC1 = eC2 = ::: = eCm =
C = (C1 ; C

2 ; :::; C

n; D
(:)) and Ch = (k

h; x

h) for all h = 1; :::; n and D
(:) 
(D1(:); :::; D

n(:)). If individuals do not randomize between contracts (i.e. all indi-
viduals of a given type choose the same contract), Ci = (k

i ; x

i ) denotes the contract
chosen by type i individuals.
A symmetric equilibrium of the market game sustains an equilibrium allocation
f(W 1i ;W 2i ); i = 1; :::; ng, where (W 1i ;W 2i ) is the lottery on nal wealth induced by
the equilibrium strategies for type i individuals (meaning that their nal wealth isW 1i
with probability 1  i and W 2i with probability i) with
W 1i = WN   ki +Di ;
W 2i = WA + x

i +D

i ;
where
Di  Di (1=m;1; :::; n=m;n) with i  i(Ci ):
To establish the existence of such a symmetric equilibrium, we rst characterize a can-
didate equilibrium allocation by following the Spence (1978) approach to the Miyazaki-
Wilson equilibrium with an arbitrary number of types, and next we show that this al-
location is sustained by strategy proles which are a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
of the market game.
As Spence (1978), let us rst dene a sequence of expected utility levels ui as
follows:
u1 = max(1  1)u(W 1) + 1u(W 2)
with respect to W 1;W 2, subject to
(1  1)W 1 + 1(W 2 + A) =WN
and for 2  k  n, ui is dened as
ui = max(1  i)u(W 1i ) + iu(W 2i )
with respect to W 1h ;W
2
h ; h = 1; :::; i , subject to
(1  h)u(W 1h ) + hu(W 2h )  uh for h < i; (6)
(1  h)u(W 1h ) + hu(W 2h )  (1  h)u(W 1h+1) + hu(W 2h+1) for h < i; (7)
iX
h=1
[(1  h)W 1h + h(W 2h + A)] =WN : (8)
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Let Pi denote the problem which denes ui, with i = 1; :::; n. The objective function
in Pi is the expected utility of type i individuals by restricting attention to individuals
with types 1 to i. Constraints (6) ensure that higher risk individuals (i.e. h < i) get
expected utility no less than uh. (7) are incentive compatibility constraints : since we
maximize the expected utility of type i individuals, the only constraints that may be
binding are those that keep type h individuals (with h < i) from choosing the policy
targeted for type h + 1. (8) is the break-even constraint. For n = 2, the optimal
solution to P2 is the Miyazaki-Wilson equilibrium allocation considered in Section 3.
Let f(cW 1i ;cW 2i ); i = 1; :::; ng be the optimal solution to Pn.The following Lemmas are
adapted from Spence (1978).
Lemma 1 There exists ` 2 f0; :::; ng,  = 0; :::;  + 1 with `0 = 0 < `1  `2 :::  `
< `+1 = n such that for all  = 0; :::; 
hX
i=`+1
i[WN   (1  i)cW 1i   i(cW 2i + A)] < 0 for all h = ` + 1; :::; `+1   1;
`+1X
i=`+1
i[WN   (1  i)cW 1i   i(cW 2i + A)] = 0:
Furthermore, we have
(1  i)u(cW 1i ) + iu(cW 2i ) = ui if i 2 f`1; `2; :::; ng;
(1  i)u(cW 1i ) + iu(cW 2i ) > ui otherwise:
Lemma 2 There does not exist any incentive compatible allocation f(W 1h ;W 2h ); h =
1; :::; ng such that
(1  `)u(W 1`) + `u(W 2`)  u` for all  = 1; :::;  + 1 (9)
and
nX
h=1
h[WN   (1  h)W 1h   h(W 2h + A)] > 0: (10)
The sequence ui; i = 1; :::; n corresponds to reservation utilities. If type is expected
utility were lower than ui, then it would be possible to make positive prot by attract-
ing type i individuals and all more risky types h < i. Maximizing type i expected
utility in Pi may require to increase the expected utility of more risky types over their
reservation utility uh, in order to relax their incentive compatibility constraints. The
optimal solution to Pi involves a trade o¤ between reducing the cost of more risky
types and relaxing their incentive compatibility constraints. This trade o¤ may tip in
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favor of the reduction of cost or of the relaxation of incentive compatibility constraints.
Constraint (6) is binding in the rst case and it is slack in the second one. Lemma 1
characterizes the optimal solution to this trade o¤ in Pn. The Lemma states that risk
types are pooled in subgroups indexed by . Within each subgroup, all types except
the highest (i.e. h = `+1; :::; `+1 1) get more than their reservation utility uh, with
negative prot over this subset of individuals. They are cross-subsidized by the high-
est risk type, i.e. by `+1). Type `+1 just reach its reservation utility u`+1 with zero
prot over the whole subgroup. Increasing the expected utility of type `+1 over u`+1
would be suboptimal. Lemma 1 is illustrated in Figure 9, with n = 5;  = 2; `1 = 3
and `2 = 4. There are three subgroups in this example: type i = 3 cross-subsidizes
types 1 and 2, while the contracts o¤ered to types 4 and 5 make zero prot. We have
uh > uh for h = 1; 2 and uh = uh for h = 3; 4 and 5, where uh is the type h expected
utility at the optimal solution to Pn.
Figure 9
Lemma 2 states that no insurer can make positive prot by attracting all individuals
and o¤ering more than u` to threshold types `. Indeed suppose that there exists an
allocation close to f(cW 1h ;cW 2h ); h = 1; :::; ng that provides more than u` to types `
and that make positive prot over subgroup h = ` + 1; :::; `+1. Such an allocation
would provide an expected utility larger than uh for all h = ` + 1; :::; `+1   1 (this
is just a consequence of the second part of Lemma 1), which would contradict the
denition of u`+1. The proof of Lemma 2 - which follows Spence (1978) - shows that
this argument extends to allocations that are not close to f(cW 1h ;cW 2h ); h = 1; :::; ng.
The main consequence of Lemma 2 is that it is impossible to make positive prot in
a deviation from f(cW 1h ;cW 2h ); h = 1; :::; ng if threshold types are guaranteed to get at
least u`+1.
Lemmas 1 and 2 easily extend to allocations where individuals of a given type may
randomize between contracts that are equivalent for him. An allocation is then a type-
dependent randomization over a set of lotteries. Formally, an allocation is dened by
a set of lotteries f(W 1s ;W 2s ); s = 1; :::; Ng and individuals choices   (1; 2; :::; n)
with i = (i1; :::; iN), where is is the probability that a type i individual chooses
(W 1s ;W
2
s ), with
NX
`=1
is = 1. In other words, type i individuals get a compound lot-
tery fWi generated by their mixed strategy i over available lotteries f(W 1s ;W 2s ); s =
1; :::; Ng23. An allocation is incentive compatible if
NX
s=1
is[(1  i)u(W 1s ) + iu(W 2s )] = maxf(1  i)u(W 1s ) + iu(W 2s ); s = 1; :::; Ng;
23N is given but arbitrarily large.
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for all i = 1; :::; n 1. In words, an allocation is incentive compatible when individuals
only choose their best contract with positive probability. The denition of Problem
Ph for h = 1; :::; n can be extended straightforwardly to this more general setting, with
unchanged denition of uh. In particular, individuals choose only one (non compound)
lottery at the optimal solution to Ph, and the optimal solution of Pn is still fWi = cWi24.
Lemma 1 is thus still valid. Lemma 3 straighforwardly extends Lemma 2 to the case
where individuals may randomize between contract.
Lemma 3 There does not exist any incentive compatible allocation with randomization
f(W 1s ;W 2s ); s = 1; :::; N ;  (1; 2; :::; n)g such that
NX
s=1
`;s[(1  `)u(W 1s ) + `u(W 2s )]  u` for all  = 1; :::;  + 1 (11)
and
nX
h=1
hf
NX
s=1
hs[WN   (1  h)W 1s   h(W 2s + A)]g > 0: (12)
Proposition 3 f(cW 1i ;cW 2i ); i = 1; :::; ng is an equilibrium allocation sustained by a
symmetric equilibrium of the market game where insurers o¤er participating contracts.
Type i individuals choose Ci = bCi  (bki; bxi) with bki = WN  cW 1i ; bxi = cW 2i  WA and
D(:) is such that
nX
i=1
Di (N1; P1; :::; Nn; Pn) 
nX
i=1
NiPi (13)
Di (
1
m
;( bC1); :::; n
m
;( bCn)) = 0 for all i = 1; :::; n (14)
D`(N1; P1; :::; Nn; Pn)  0 for all  = 1; :::;  + 1: (15)
Proposition 3 establishes the existence of a symmetric equilibrium in the extended
RSmodel with an arbitrary number of types. Each insurer o¤ersC = ( bC1; :::; bCn; D(:))
and type i individuals choose bCi. (13) means that there is full distribution of prot to
policyholders (or additional premiums will be levied to cover losses if any) but from
(15) threshold types ` are excluded from the sharing of prots.
From (14) no policy dividend is paid on the equilibrium path. However there may
be policy dividends or supplementary premiums when a deviant insurer j0 o¤ers a
24Consider a randomized allocation which is feasible in Ph and replace it by another allocation
without randomization where individuals choose (with probability 1) the most protable lottery
which they choose with positive probability in the initial lottery. By doing that, we relax the prot
constraint and other constraints still hold in Ph. This shows that individuals do not randomize at an
optimal solution to Ph. This argument is also used in the proof of Lemma 3.
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menu Cj0 of contracts that di¤ers from C = ( bC1; :::; bCn). Indeed such a deviation
may a¤ect the types distribution of individuals who still choose a contract in C,
with possible variations in prots or losses of other insurers j 6= j0, and thus policy
dividends or supplementary premiums. Variations in policy dividends can then act
as an implicit threat that dissuades deviant insurers from undertaking competitive
attacks. As an intuitive example to understand the logic of this threat, consider the
following example:
Di (N1; P1; :::; Nn; Pn) =
Ni(bki   bk`+1)
`+1X
h=`+1
Nh(bkh   bk`+1)
`+1X
h=`+1
NhPh for all i = 1; :::; n (16)
for all i 2 f` + 1; :::; `+1g and all  2 f0; :::; g:Here D(:) involves the sharing of
prot within each subgroup  = 0; :::; . The total prot made within subgroup  is
`+1X
h=`+1
NhPh. It is a¤ected to policyholders within the same subgroup. Furthermore,
according to the policy dividend rule, the larger the premium, the larger the (net)
policy dividend. There is no right to receive policy dividend for the individuals who
pay the smallest premium (i.e. for type `+1) while rights are larger for types i who pay
larger premiums. We have
`+1X
h=`+1
h( bCh) = 0 for all , and thus this policy dividend
rule satises conditions (13)-(15).
If a deviant insurer j0 attracts some individuals who cross-subsidize other risk
types within subgroup , then after the deviation we will have
`+1X
h=`+1
NhPh < 0 for
non-deviant insurers j 6= j0 and consequently the welfare of these other individuals
will deteriorate if they keep choosing the same contract because they will have to pay
supplementary premiums. It may then be impossible for insurer j0 not to attract them
also, which will make its o¤er non-protable. The proof of Proposition 3 shows that
this is indeed the case.
More generally, when D(:) is such that
`+1X
h=`+1
Dh(N1; P1; :::; Nn; Pn) 
`+1X
h=`+1
NhPh;
then the equilibrium allocation is also sustained by equilibrium strategies where each
insurer sells insurance to a given subgroup of individuals (gathering risk types h =
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` + 1; :::; `+1) or to a combination of these subgroups. Insurers who sell insurance to
subgroups with only one risk type (i.e. groups such that ` + 1 = `+1) or to a com-
bination of these subgroups do not cross-subsidize risks. They o¤er non-participating
policies, and we may consider them as stock insurers. Insurers who sell insurance
policies to subgroups with cross-subsidization (i.e. such that ` + 1 < `+1) cross-
subsidize risks and they o¤er participating policies with full distribution of prot to
policyholders: they act as mutuals do. Hence, the model explain why stock insurers
and mutuals may coexist : mutuals o¤er insurance contracts that are robust to com-
petitive attacks when there is cross-susidization, while stock insurers o¤er insurance
contracts at actuarial price.
5 Deferred premium variations
More often than not mutuals shift the payment of underwriting prot to their members
by transferring current prot to reserves and by later increasing or decreasing premi-
ums according to the level of accumulated surplus. Reserves then act act as a shock
absorber and unforeseen supplementary calls occur only in case of large unexpected
losses. Such deferred premium variations are substitutes to policy dividends and sup-
plementary premiums paid or levied during the current period. They may have similar
strategic e¤ects, but they also entail specic dynamic issues that are more complex
than the instantaneous contracting problem we have considered thus far. Although a
comprehensive dynamic analysis is out of the scope of this paper, we may nevertheless
sketch the similarities and di¤erences between participating contracts and deferred
premium variations.
Consider an overlapping generation setting in which each individual lives for two
periods (1 and 2). Assume that money can be transferred costlessly over time with zero
interest rate. Assume also that transaction costs prevent individuals from changing
their insurers between periods 1 and 2, which is of course a very strong assumption.
Type i individuals su¤er loss A at each period of their life with probability i. In-
surers o¤er intertemporal insurance contracts with variable premiums. Contractual
agreements specify the net coverage x in the case of an accident (be it at period 1 or
2). Premium may increase or decrease between periods 1 and 2 according to under-
writing prots made at period 1. Policyholders pay k at period 1 and k D at period
2, where D depends on the prot made at period 1. D is thus analogous to a policy
dividend moved one period back25. For example, if the premium increase just covers
the underwriting losses over the two periods, we should have D = 2P , where P is the
25Experience rating (i.e. conditioning the premium paid at period 2 on the policyholders loss
experience at period 1) would improve the e¢ ciency of market mechanisms. It is not considered here
for notational simplicity.
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underwriting prot per period26
Since wealth can be transferred over time without cost, individuals maximize the
expected utility of their cumulated nal wealth, which is written as
Eu = (1  )2u(WN   2k +D)
+2(1  )u(WA1 + x+D) + 2u(WA2 + 2x+D);
where WA1 = WN   A;WA2 = WN   2A and  = i for type i individuals. An
allocation is now written as f(W 1i ;W 2i1;W 2i2); i = 1; :::; ng, where W 1i denotes the nal
wealth of type i individuals who do not su¤er any accident and W 2i1 (respect.W
2
i2) is
the nal wealth in case of one accident (respect. two accidents), with
W 1i = WN   2ki +Di;
W 2i1 = WA1 + xi +Di;
W 2i2 = WA2 + 2xi +Di;
where ki; xi and Di refer to the insurance contract chosen by type i individuals.
The developments and conclusions of Section 4 can be straightforwardly adapted
to this new setting, with unchanged denitions of reservation utility ui and of the
candidate equilibrium allocation f(cW 1i ;cW 2i1;cW 2i2); i = 1; :::; ng27. This allocation is
sustained by a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the market game where insur-
ers o¤er intertemporal insurance contracts with variable premiums to each cohort of
individuals who enter the market.
Matters would be much less obvious if individuals could move to another insurer
between periods 1 and 2. Indeed consider the two risk type case and assume that there
is cross-subsidization at the candidate equilibrium. Then if a deviant insurer attracts
low risk individuals at the rst period of their life, thereby leading to underwriting
losses for non-deviant insurers, then high risks may choose to quit only at period
2 in order to escape from the increase in premium. However, by doing that they
would signal themselves as high risk (because low risks are attracted from period 1),
which would reduce the advantage they may get from moving to another insurer. This
signalling e¤ect may lead high risk individuals either to move to the deviant insurer
over the two periods of their life or not to move at all. Whether it is su¢ cient to
annihilate competitive attacks remains an open issue.
26Note that prot remains constant across time for a given cohort since policyholders do not change
insurers between the two periods of their life.
27Note in particular that the marginal rate of substitution between x and k is increasing with 
when x  A. Indi¤erence curves thus cross only one time in this part of the (x; k) plane, which
implies that only upward adjacent incentive compatibility constraints are binding. The analysis of
Section 4 can thus be replicated without substantial change.
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6 Concluding comments
The initial motivation of this paper was an inquiry on the nonexistence of equilibrium
in the RS model, starting with the observation that this model restricts the set of
insurance contracts to non-participating policies. The result of this inquiry is actually
striking since it turns out that allowing insurers to o¤er participating policies guar-
antees the existence of an equilibrium in the RS model. The equilibrium allocation
coincides with the MSW allocation. In the case of two groups of individuals, there is
cross-subsidization between contracts when the proportion of high risks individuals is
under a threshold, while the equilibrium allocation coincides with Rothschild-Stiglitz
pair of contracts in the other case. In the general case with an arbitrary number of risk
types, the equilibrium alllocation is characterized by a classication of individuals into
subgroups as done by Spence (1978), with cross-subsidization within each subgroup.
Participating policies act as an implicit threat which prevents deviant insurers to
attract low risk individuals only. If a deviant insurer attracts individuals who cross-
subsidize other risk types within a given subgroup, then these other individuals will
have to pay supplementary premiums if they keep choosing the same contract from
their non-deviant insurer. Consequently it will be impossible for the deviant insurer
not to attract them also, which will make its o¤er non-protable. This mechanism
is similar to the logic of the MSW equilibrium. In both cases, a deviant insurer is
detered to attract low risk individuals because it is expected that ultimately its o¤er
would also attract higher risks, which would make it unprotable. However, in the
MSW equilibrium insurers are protected from these competitive attacks because they
can react by withdrawing contracts that become unprotable. This assumption is
most unsatisfactory because it means that insurers are not committed to actually o¤er
the announced contracts. It can also be legitimately argued that this description of
the dynamic relationship between insurers is arbitrary. Other timings are possible, as
shown by Riley (1979), Hellwig (1987) and others. The present model has not stepped
away from the Nash equilibrium setting of the RS model, and we have just explored the
consequences of deleting an exogenous restriction on the content of insurance policies.
More than the solution to a theoretical puzzle, the outcome of this inquiry on the
extended RS model provides a new explanation about why mutuals are so widespread
in insurance markets and why they coexist with stock insurers. Most explanations
about why mutuals may be more e¢ cient than stock insurers are either based on the
reduction in agency costs made possible by the mutual corporate form (Mayers and
Smith,1988; Smith and Stutzer,1995), on the fact that mutuals may emerge as a risk
screening mechanism (Smith and Stutzer,1990; Ligon and Thistle,2005) or on their
ability to cover undiversiable risks (Doherty and Dionne,1993). This paper has ex-
plored a di¤erent way. Starting from the RS equilibrium puzzle, we nally came to the
conclusion that mutuals endogenously emerge in a competitive setting when second-
best allocative e¢ ciency requires cross-subsidization, while stock insurers can survive
in the other cases. Comparing the empirical validity of these approaches remains an
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open issue. At this stage, the only conclusion we can draw is that mutuals are robust
to competitive attacks in insurance markets characterized by adverse selection, which
may not be the case for stock insurance companies.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
If
Pi
h=1 i[WN   (1  i)cW 1i   i(cW 2i +A)] > 0 for i 2 f1; :::; ng, then it would be
possible to provide a higher expected utility than u` for all ` = 1; :::; i, while breaking
even over the subset of individuals ` = 1; :::; i, which would contradict the denition
of ui. We thus have
Pi
h=1 i[WN   (1 i)cW 1i  i(cW 2i +A)]  0 for all i 2 f1; :::; ng,
which yields the rst part of the Lemma.
We have (1   i)u(cW 1i ) + iu(cW 2i )  ui for all i from the denition of Pn. If
i 2 f`1; `2; :::; ng, we have
Pi
h=1 h[(1   h)cW 1h + h(cW 2h + A)] = WN from the rst
part of the Lemma and we deduce (1   i)u(cW 1i ) + iu(cW 2i ) = ui, for otherwise we
would have a contradiction with the denition of ui. Conversely, suppose we have (1 
i)u(cW 1i ) + iu(cW 2i ) = ui and i =2 f`1; `2; :::; ng. We would then have Pih=1 h[WN  
(1   h)cW 1h   h(cW 2h + A)] < 0. Hence the allocation f(cW 1h ;cW 2h ); h = 1; :::; ig is
in decit. Let f(W 10h ;W 20h ); h = 1; :::; ig be the optimal solution to Pi. Replacing
f(cW 1h ;cW 2h ); h = 1; :::; ig by f(W 10h ;W 20h ); h = 1; :::; ig allows us to improve the optimal
solution to Pn, since the same type i expected utility ui can be reached while breaking
even on the set h = 1; :::; i, which provides additional resources that could be used to
raise (1   n)u(W 1n) + nu(W 2n) over (1   n)u(cW 1n) + nu(cW 2n). We thus obtain a
contradiction with the fact that f(cW 1i ;cW 2i ); i = 1; :::; ng is the optimal solution to Pn.
Proof of Lemma 2
We rst restrict attention to incentive compatible allocations f(W 1h ;W 2h ); h =
1; :::; ng located in a neighbourhood of f(cW 1h ;cW 2h ); i = 1; :::; ng. Suppose that such
an allocation satises (9)-(10). Lemma 1 shows that
(1  h)u(W 1h ) + hu(W 2h )  uh for all h = 1; :::; n; (17)
if (W 1h ;W
2
h ) is close enough to (cW 1h ;cW 2h ). Hence f(W 1h ;W 2h ); h = 1; :::; ng satises the
constraints of Pn for h = 1; :::; i with positive prots and expected utility larger or
equal to un for type n, hence a contradiction.
We now prove that there does not exist any incentive compatible allocation
f(W 1h ;W 2h ); h = 1; :::; ng that satises (9)-(10) even if we do not restrict attention
to allocations close to f(cW 1h ;cW 2h ); i = 1; :::; ng. Let us dene
qh  1  h
h
u(W 1h ); zh  u(W 2h )
bqh  1  h
h
u(cW 1h ); bzh  u(cW 2h ):
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With this change of variable the Lemma states that there does not exist f(qh; zh); h =
1; :::; ng such that
q` + z` 
u`
`
for all  = 1; :::;  + 1 ; (18)
qh + zh  1  h
h
h+1
1  h+1 qh+1 + zh+1 for h = 1; :::; n  1 ; (19)
nX
h=1
hf(1  h)[WN   u 1( hqh
1  h )]  h[u
 1(zh) WA]g
>
nX
h=1
hf(1  h)[WN   u 1( hbqh
1  h )]  h[u
 1(bzh) WA]g: (20)
The set of fqh; zh; h = 1; :::; ng that satises the conditions (18)-(20) is convex28.
Hence if there is any allocation fqh; zh; h = 1; :::; ng that satises conditions (18)-(20),
there is an allocation in any neighbourhood of fbqh; bzh; h = 1; :::; ng that satises them,
which contradicts our previous result.
Proof of Lemma 3
For a given incentive compatible allocation with randomisation f(W 1s ;W 2s ); s =
1; :::; N ;  (1; 2; :::; n)g, let (W 1h;W
2
h) = (W
1
s(h);W
2
s(h)) be the most protable
lottery which is chosen by type h individuals with positive probability, i.e. s(h) is such
that h;s(h) > 0 and
(1  h)W 1s(h) + hW 2s(h)W 2s(h)  (1  h)W 1s0 + hW 2s0
for all s0 such that h;s0 > 0. If (11)-(12) hold for the initial allocation with random-
ization, then (9)-(10) also hold for the non-randomized incentive compatible allocation
f(W 1h;W
2
h); h = 1; :::; ng, which contradicts Lemma 2.
Proof of Proposition 3
Assume that each insurer o¤ers bC = ( bC1; bC2; :::; bCn; D(:)) with D(:) such that
(13)-(15) hold. Then bCi is an optimal choice of type i individuals if they expect that
no policy dividend will be paid on any contract. When all individuals are evenly shared
among insurers, then (14) implies that no policy dividend is actually paid.
Suppose some insurer j0 deviates from bC to another menuCj0 = fCj01 ; Cj02 ; :::; Cj0n ; Dj0(:)g
with Cj0i = (k
j0
i ; x
j0
i ). Let e(Cj0 ; bC j0) be a continuation equilibrium following the
deviation, i.e. equilibrium contract choices by individuals when Cj0 and bC are simul-
taneously o¤ered, respectively by insurer j0 and by all the other insurers j 6= j0. Such
a continuation equilibrium exists since it is a mixed-strategy equilibrium of a nite
28Note in particular that u 1(:) is convex because u(:) is concave.
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strategic-form game. Let P
j
h be the prot per policyholder made by insurer j 6= j0 on
contract bCh and N jh be the proportion of the population who is purchasing bCh from
insurer j at such a continuation equilibrium, i.e.
P
j
h 
nX
i=1
iejih(Cj0 ; bC j0)i( bCh)
nX
i=1
iejih(Cj0 ; bC j0) ;
N
j
h =
nX
i=1
iejih(Cj0 ; bC j0):
Choose eachDj(:) so thatDjh(:) is homogeneous of degree 1 with respect to (N
j
1 ; :::; N
j
n)
for all h = 1; :::; n and consider a continuation equilibrium where individuals of a
given type are evenly shared between insurers j 6= j0, i.e. where ejih(Cj0 ; bC j0) =ej0ih(Cj0 ; bC j0) for all h if j 6= j0, j; j0 6= j029. We may then use more compact
notations e0ih  ej0ih(Cj0 ; bC j0) and e1ih  ejih(Cj0 ; bC j0); P 1h = P jh; N1h = N jh for all
j 6= j0. Let also
P
0
h 
nX
i=1
iej0ih(Cj0 ; bC j0)i(Cj0h )
nX
i=1
iej0ih(Cj0 ; bC j0) ;
N
0
h =
nX
i=1
iej0ih(Cj0 ; bC j0)
denote respectively the average prot made on Cj0h by insurer j0 and the proportion of
individuals who choose Cj0h . Hence, after the deviation by insurer j0, type i individuals
get the following lottery on nal wealth :
(W 1;W 2) = (W 10h;W
2
0h)  (WN   kj0h +D
0
h;WA + x
j0
h +D
0
h) with probability e0ih;
(W 1;W 2) = (W 11h;W
2
1h)  (cW 1h +D1h;cW 2h +D1h) with probability e1ih(n  1);
where
D
0
h = D
j0
h (N
0
1; P
0
1; :::; N
0
n; P
0
n);
D
1
h = D

h(N
1
1; P
1
1; :::; N
1
n; P
1
n);
29Such a continuation equilibrium exists because it is a Nash equilibrium of an equivalent game
with only two insurers that respectively o¤er bC j0and Cj0 . Note that this equivalence is possible
because Djh(:) is homogeneous of degree 1 with respect to (N
j
1 ; :::; N
j
n).
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for h = 1; :::; n, with
nX
h=1
[e0ih + e1ih(n  1)] = 1. Let us denote this lottery by L.
Let  denote the residual prot made by insurer j0. We have
 =
nX
i=1
if
nX
h=1
e0ih[WN   (1  i)W 10h   i(W 20h + A)]g: (21)
We know from (13) that D(:) involves the full distribution of prot. Hence non-
deviant insurers j make zero residual prot. We thus have
nX
i=1
if
nX
h=1
e1ih[WN   (1  i)W 11h   i(W 21h + A)]g = 0: (22)
Adding (21) to (22) multiplied by n  1 yields
 =
nX
i=1
if
nX
h=1
e0ih[WN   (1  i)W 10h   i(W 20h + A)]
+(n  1)
nX
h=1
e1ih[WN   (1  i)W 11h   i(W 21h + A)]g: (23)
Furthermore, we have
nX
h=1
e0`;h[(1  `)u(W 10h) + `u(W 20h)]
+(n  1)
nX
h=1
e1`;h[(1  `)u(W 11h) + `u(W 21h)
 u` for all  = 1; :::;  + 1 (24)
because (W 11` ;W
2
1`
) = (cW 11` ;cW 21`) since D1` = 0 from (15) and (1   `)u(cW 11`) +
`u(
cW 21`) = u` and fe0`;h; e1`;h; h = 1; :::; ng is an optimal contract choice strategy
of type ` individuals. Lemma 3 applied to lottery L then gives   0. Hence the
deviation is non-protable, which completes the proof.
References
Boyd, J.H., .C. Prescott and B.D. Smith, 1988, "Organizations in economic analy-
sis", Canadian Journal of Economics,21, 477-491.
Crocker, K.J. and A. Snow, 1985, "The e¢ ciency of competitive equilibria in in-
surance markets with asymmetric information", Journal of Public Economics, 26:2,
207-220.
27
Doherty, N.A. and G. Dionne, 1993, "Insurance with undiversiable risk : contract
structure and organizational forms of insurance rms", Journal of Risk and Uncer-
tainty, 6, 187-203.
Engers, M. and L. Fernandez, 1987, "Market equilibrium with hidden knowledge
and self selection", Econometrica, 55, 425-439.
Hellwig, M., 1987, "Some recent developments in the theory of competition in
markets with adverse selection", European Economic Review, 31, 319-325.
Ligon, J. A. and P.D. Thistle, 2005, "The formation of mutual insurers in markets
with adverse selection, Journal of Business, 78, 529-555.
Mayers, D. and C. Smith, 1988, "Ownership structure accross lines of property-
casualty insurance", Journal of Law and Economics, 31, 351-378.
Miyazaki, H., 1977, "The rat race and internal labor markets", Bell Journal of
Economics, 8, 394-418.
Riley, J., 1979, "Informational equilibrium", Econometrica, 47, 331-359.
Rothschild, M. and J.E. Stiglitz, 1976, "Equilibrium in competitive insurance mar-
kets: an essay on the economics of imperfect information, Quartely Journal of Eco-
nomics, 90, 630-649.
Smith, B.D. and M.J. Stutzer, 1990, "Adverse selection, aggregate uncertainty and
the role for mutual insurance contracts, Journal of Business, 63, 493-510.
Smith, B.D. and M.J. Stutzer, 1995, "A theory of mutual formation and moral
hazard with evidence from the history of the insurance industry", Review of Economic
Studies, 8, 545-577, 1995.
Spence, M., 1978, "Product di¤erentiation and performance in insurance markets",
Journal of Public Economics, 10, 427-447.
Wilson, C., 1977, "A model of insurance markets with incomplete information",
Journal of Economic Theory, 16, 167-207.
28
W1 
W2 
0 
E 
F1 
F 
F2 
C1 * C2 
** 
Type 2 indifference curves 
type 1 indifference curve 
WN 
WA 
Figure 1 
. 
. 
C2 
∗ . 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
F2 
. 
W1 
 
W2 
 
0 WN 
 
WA 
 
C . 
C′ 
E 
F 
F1 
Figure 2 
Type 2 indifference curve 
 
Type 1 indifference curve 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WN 
WA E 
W1 
W2 
. 
Figure 3 
C2 
 
** 
 . 
C1 
 
* 
 
. 
0 
C′ 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WN 
WA 
E 
 
W1 
W2 
Figure 4 
0 
F2 
F1 
. 
. 
. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
. C′ 
 
 
 
 
 
W1 
W2 
. 
0 WN 
WA 
E 
F 
F1 
Figure 5 
F2 
. 
. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
W1 
W2 
0 WN 
WA E 
F2 
F 
F1 
 
 
 
 
. 
Figure 6 
. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
E 
H 
G 
0 
W1 
W2 
C1 * C2 
 
** 
Figure 7 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
H 
 
G 
W1 
W2 
0 
C1 * 
C2 ** 
E 
F2 
F 
F1 
Figure 8 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 i 
Profit on type i 
n = 5 
Figure 9 
